In this paper, we find particular use for a maximally entangled initial state that produces a quantized version of two player two strategy games. When applied to a variant of the well-known game of Chicken, our construction shows the existence of new Nash equilibria with the players receiving better payoffs than those found in literature.
Introduction
We consider an arbitrary two player, two strategy game whose payoff function is given in Table 1 below.
By a pure classical game G, we mean the quadruple G = (S 1 , S 2 , P 1 , P 2 ), where S 1 = {s 1 , s 2 } and S 2 = {t 1 , t 2 } are the pure strategy spaces of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively, and { } are the payoff functions for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Note that in the game G the players' pure strategies are discrete. Suppose now that the players are allowed to randomize their pure strategies, i.e. they can employ real convex combinations of their pure strategies, that is, they can use mixed strategies. For example, Player 1 could observe a fair coin and decide to play s 1 
if it falls
Heads and s 2 if it falls Tails. We will denote the set of probability distributions over the set S i by ( ) i S ∆ and observe that, for a player, selecting a mixed strategy is equivalent to choosing a number in the unit interval [0, 1] . More specifically, the mixed strategy spaces of the players are respectively. Given a profile (p, q) of probability distributions over the S i 's, Player i obtains an expected outcome given by a probability distribution over the outcomes of G, that is an element of ( )
, the set of probability distributions over the image of i P . Now the game G is extended to a new, larger game G mix , the mixed classical game associated to G. By a mixed classical game G mix , we mean the quadruple is Player i's expected payoff function. More explicitly, if Player 1 uses his pure strategy s 1 with probability p and Player 2 uses her pure strategy t 1 with probability q, then the expected outcome to Player i is given by ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) of ( )
is not realizable by any choice of p and q. This observation motivates the quest for a higher randomization apparatus: quantum superposition followed by quantum measurement. More specifically, let us assume that H is a finite-dimensional complex vector space, and that we have a finite set X which is in one-to-one correspondence with an orthogonal basis B of H. By a quantum superposition of X with respect to the basis B we mean a complex projective linear combination of elements of X; that is, a representative of an equivalence class of complex linear combinations where the equivalence between combinations is given by non-zero scalar multiplication. Quantum mechanics calls this scalar a phase. When the context is clear as to the basis to which the set X is identified, denote the set of quantum superpositions for X as QS(X).
As the underlying space of complex linear combinations is a Hilbert space, we can assign a length to each linear combination and, up to phase, always represent a projective linear combination by a complex linear combination of Length 1. This process is called normalization and is frequently useful.
For each quantum superposition of X we can obtain a probability distribution over X by assigning to each component the ratio of the square of the length of its coefficient to the square of the length of the combination. For example, the probability distribution produced from the quantum superposition x y α β + is just This process is called a quantum measurement with respect to X, and note that geometrically quantum mea-surement is defined by projecting a normalized quantum superposition onto the various elements of the normalized basis B. Now assume that our game G is played under mediated quantum communication a la Eisert, Lewenstein, and Wilkins (EWL) [1] That is, players have a referee mediate their game and the communication of their strategic choices over quantum channels. When there are two strategic choices for each player in the classical game, players and the referee communicate over quantum channels via qubits, a two pure state quantum system with a fixed observational basis. This observational basis is given in the so-called Dirac notation by 0 and 1 . This basis also induces an observational basis of the space of the joint states of the players' qubits denoted in the Dirac notation by 00 , 01 , 10 , 11 . First, the referee prepares two qubits in the initial state ψ , an element of the Hilbert space H 4 and of the form 00 11
The referee sends each player one of the qubits. Players then send back their individual qubits in the other state (Flipped) or in the original state (Un-Flipped) to indicate the choice of their second or first classical pure strategy, respectively. The returned qubits are examined by the referee who then makes the appropriate payoffs. So, under this description, we can think of the game G as a two-player two-strategy game in which both players have the same set of pure strategies, namely {No Flip, Flip}. 
More specifically, let the actions No Flip and Flip be represented by the SU(2) matrices 1 0 
Im
is referred to as the expected quantum payoff function for Player i. For more details on game extensions, the reader is referred to [2] .
The actual computation of the payoffs that arise from a specific profile of players' choices of elements of SU (2) Other ways of expressing this concept include the observation that no player can increase his or her payoff by unilaterally deviating from his or her equilibrium strategy or that at the equilibrium a player's opponents are indifferent to that player's strategic choice. The existence of equilibria in a game in which the S i 's are all finite is guaranteed by Nash theorem [3] .
Quantum Payoff Function
There are many quantization protocols in the literature, including some that utilize the initial state 00 11 2 ψ + = [4] . In this paper, we consider two qubits with respect to the observational basis { } 0 , 1 in the initial state given by Equation (1.9). The players operate on their respective qubits, the first via
and the second via
respectively. Recall that the quantities A, B, P, and Q are complex numbers subject to the normalization constraints
After the players act the initial state becomes with respect to the observational basis of the space of the joint states of the players' qubits ( ) 
We will refer to Equation (2.3) as the game state with respect to the observational basis. We consider next the actions No Flip and Flip represented by the SU(2) matrices given by Equation (1.9). Note that
The last two equalities hold because the axioms of quantum mechanics stipulate that two states that differ by multiplication of a nonzero complex scalar, called a phase, are equal. So, in the joint observational basis { } 00 , 01 , 10 , 11 we obtain that the game states corresponding to the action profiles are given by 
Note that the foregoing vectors can be also expressed in matrix form as
For the purpose of the EWL protocols, these states are to correspond to a physical property observable to the referee. For this, the axioms of quantum mechanics require these states to form an orthogonal basis of the joint state space of the two qubits. For two elements x and y of an n-dimensional complex vector space C n , we use the 
Therefore, after the players act, the game state becomes with respect to the action basis
Re Re
Hence, the referee observing the game state in the action basis sees each pure action state with probability given by ( ) 
This result leads to the following definition: Definition 2.1 Let G be the game described in Table 1 . Then the associated quantization Q G ψ with respect to the initial state ψ is the two player game in which each player's strategy space is the set of special unitary matrices, SU (2) , and the quantum payoff functions for Player I and Player II are defined as follows: 
As Equations (2.10) -(2.12) indicate, the use of SU(2) elements will prove impractical when one undertakes the important task of identifying potential quantum Nash equilibria of the game indicated in Table 1 . We will utilize the unit quaternions instead of the SU(2) elements. The unit quaternions turn out to be more efficient and convenient in simplifying a great deal of equilibrium calculations.
First, we begin with a brief review of the real division algebra of the quaternions which can be also found in [5] and [6] .
Quaternions
The quaternions, denoted by H, are a 4-dimensional normed division algebra over the real numbers. They are spanned by the identity element 1 and three imaginary units i, j, and k. These fundamental units satisfy the so-called Hamilton's relation given by Equation (2. 
One can easily verify that the norm of a product of quaternions is the product of their norms, that is,
Each non-zero quaternion possesses a non-zero inverse ( )
This establishes the set of non-zero quaternions as division algebra. Moreover, the set of unit quaternions
forms a subgroup of H -{0} under quaternionic multiplication and can be thought as the unit 3-sphere S 3 living in R 4 . In light of the discussion above, one can see that the set of non-zero quaternions forms a skew-field. We can also express a general quaternion in the form , p j α β = + where α and β are complex numbers. In this case, if q j δ γ = + , then quaternionic multiplication is given by the map
α β δ γ αδ βγ αγ βδ
There are other identifications of S 3 that are of interest to us beyond that of the unit quaternions, in particular the identification of S 3 with the special unitary group of two-by-two complex matrices, SU (2) . That is, those matrices with orthonormal columns and determinant 1. This group isomorphism is given by the map , j α β α β β α
where the complex numbers α and β are subject to the normalization condition 2 2 1.
α β + =
For more details on real division algebras in general, and on quaternions in particular, the reader is referred to [7] [8] .
Unit Quaternions as Strategies
There are many isomorphisms between the group SU(2) of special unitary matrices and the group S 3 of unit quaternions. We consider the following identifications. This product can be also expressed as 
Comparing Equations (2.10) and (3.16), we conclude that 
This result motivates the following definition. Definition 3.1.2 Let G be the game depicted in Table 1 
This matrix is unitary, therefore the basis change matrix from B 0 to B 1 is A. Shaik, A. Ahmed
If the players employ unit quaternions based on 1, i, j, and k then the payoffs to Player I and Player II are
respectively, where x t and y t are taken from 
It is sufficient to choose p = 1 and
Mixed Quantum Strategies
A mixed quantum strategy is a probability distribution over the set of unit quaternions. While the consideration of the entire space of mixed quantum strategies remains a goal of a future work, the use of mixed quantum strategies supported on the canonical basis elements 1, i, j and k, that is, elements of the form has already established some interesting results. Definition 4.1 Let G be the game depicted in Table 1 . Then the corresponding mixed quantum game with respect to the initial state ψ, mQ G ψ , is the two player game in which each player's strategy space is the set of probability distributions over the unit quaternions and Player i's expected payoff function is ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 3 : Im
As we did in the game G Q , we will derive equations for the players' expected payoff functions in the game ( )   2  3  2  3  2  3  2  3  1  0  0 0  1 1  2  3  1  0 1  1 0  2  3   2  3  2  3  2  3  2  3  2  0  1  2 0  3 1  3  0  1  2 1  3 0   ,  2  2  2  2   2  2  2 2
or, in matrix form ( ) (  )   2  3  2  3  0  1   0  2  3  2  3  1  0  1  1  0  1  2  3  2  2  3  2  3  0  1  3   2  3  2  3  1  0   2  2   2  2  ,   2  2 2 2
Player II's expected payoff is derived in a similar manner, except that the letter x is replaced with the letter y. We note here the similarities between the quantum expected payoff function in mQ G ψ (Equation (4.5)) and the classical expected payoff function in G mix (Equation (1.6) ). Note that we can also express Equation (4.4) in the form ( ) 6) and similarly ( )
Equation (4.7) is the expected quantum payoff function for Player II. We will refer to the coefficients a t and b t as the frequencies and the numbers A t and B t as the returns.
Application
As an application of the theory discussed in the previous sections, we consider a variant of the game of Chicken with bimatrix given by Table 2 .
In the Game of Chicken, the expected payoff to Player I is given by 
The reaction curves that represent these correspondences are shown in Figure 1 , with the dashed lines for Player I's reaction curve and the solid lines for Player II's reaction curve.
It is well known that in any variant of the game of chicken there are always three classical equilibria, two in pure strategies and one in mixed strategies. Nash equilibria occur where the reaction curves intersect. From Figure 1 , one can see that the classical pure equilibria are (p = 0, q = 1) and (p = 1, q = 0) or, equivalently, the pure strategy pairs (s 2 , t 1 ) and (s 1 , t 2 ) with corresponding payoffs (3, 0) and (0, 3) to the players, respectively.
The equilibrium in mixed strategies is the pair 1 1 , 2 2
This equilibrium pays out each player an expected payoff of 1.
A. Shaik, A. Ahmed However, in contrast to the classical situation, we find, using best response analysis, that the quantized version possesses many Nash equilibria.
Equilibria of Type (Pure, Pure)
There are four equilibria where each player employs a pure quantum strategy represented by a canonical quaternionic basis element.
Proposition 5.1 The Game of Chicken described in Table 2 admits the following Nash equilibria in pure quantum strategies:
Moreover, these equilibria pay out each player an expected payoff of 2. Proof: If Players I and II employ the mixed quantum strategies 0  0  1  2  3  1  0  1  2  3   2  0  1  2  3  3  0  1  2  3   0 0  1 1  2 2  3 3   3  3  3  3  ,  2  2  2  2  2  2   3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  2 2
and 
Suppose that A 0 is the largest return. Then Player I will choose a µ that concentrates all the frequencies on A 0 , that is 0
It is clear that Player II's expected payoff is maximal when he or she responds with a ν that concentrates all the frequencies on the largest return 2, that is, 0 
Then Player I's best response will be to select µ=1.Therefore, the pure quantum strategic pair ( ) ( ) Equilibria in mixed quantum strategies occur when two or more returns are equal and maximal.
Equilibria of Type (Mix of 2, Mix of 2)
We begin with the situation where two returns are equal and maximal. Proposition 5.2 The Game of Chicken admits the following Nash equilibria in mixed quantum strategies:
, , , 1 6, 5 6 a a b b ∈ (5.13) Moreover, all these equilibria pay out each player an expected payoff of 7/4, except the equilibria given by (5.13) and (5.18) which pay out each player an expected payoff of 1.5.
Proof:
We begin by proving that the strategic pair given in Equation (5.13) is a Nash equilibrium. For this, suppose that the returns A 0 and A 1 are equal and maximal. Then, Player I will select In a similar manner, One verifies that the strategic pairs given in (5.14) -(5.18) are Nash equilibria.
Equilibria of Type (Mix of 3, Mix of 3)
When three returns are maximal and equal, we obtain four cases to study. For this particular game, it turns out that there are no equilibria of type mix of 3 against mix of 3. 0  1  2  3   3  3  2  2  2  3  3  2  2  2  3  3  2  2  2  3  3  2 
All the Returns Are Equal

